The Quasi War with France

   Most Americans have never heard of the Quasi War with France, but it was an important Naval conflict that tested the mettle of the new United States.  In July 1798 The American Delaware captured the French Croyable just off the American coast.  The Croyable was renamed the Retaliation . Shortly thereafter, a series of expeditions were launched to the West Indies, where most of the French privateers were located. The first expedition included the American United States and Delaware. These captured only a couple of privateers. The second expedition included the Retaliation, which was captured by a pair of French frigates off Guadeloupe.  The Retaliation was the only American warship captured during the war—and she was recaptured the following year.
Four squadrons, which totaled 21 ships, were sent to the West Indies once the American coastal waters were cleared. They had a easy time of it because the French were preoccupied with the British in other parts of the world. The Americans enjoyed the full support of the British Navy in the West Indies learning much from what at the time was the greatest navy in the world.
While on independent patrol, the Constellation, came upon the French Insurgente that was considered the fastest frigate the French had. Because of strong winds the Constellation was able to catch the Insurgente however as the French ship lost a mast. The Constellation was able to take advantage of this, pounding the Insurgente into submission. In this engagement, the Americans were said to have out sailed, outmaneuvered and outfought the French. The main asset in the fight for the Americans was that they never allowed the numerically superior French force to get in position to board.
A year later, the Constellation, came across the French Vengeance off Guadeloupe. The French did not wish to fight since the ship had passengers and certain cargo aboard. Nonetheless, the Constellation gave chase, eventually catching the Vengeance after a day of pursuit. Attacking after dark the Americans pounded the Vengeance with over 200 rounds of shot. The French captain, seeing the situation was hopeless tried to surrender, but the darkness concealed the attempt. The French were able to limp away under cover of darkness, but this was another clear victory for the Constellation.
The ship to see the most action during the Quasi War was the Enterprise. She was a smaller ship that was faster than most and could operate in shallow water. During one trip she actually captured 5 privateers, blew down the mast of another, and freed 11 captured American merchant ships. Another ship, the Essex also recaptured several American merchant ships.
The last battle of the Quasi War was actually fought after peace had been negotiated when the U.S. Ship Boston attacked the French Berceau. Neither the French or the Americans knew of the peace and the Americans were able to force the French to surrender. This period of American history has several lesser known wars, but all were important, especially to those that fought.

McClellan, Intelligence and the Peninsular Campaign

McClellan's Peninsular Campaign was characterized by faulty intelligence that fatally slowed down his advance from Ft. Monroe to Richmond.  Urged forward by Lincoln, McClellan's plan was to land an army at Fort Monroe, and move up the Virginia peninsula toward Richmond. Shortly after deploying at Fort Monroe, McClellan’s force began their movement up the Peninsula, approaching Yorktown. The Army of the Potomac found its path to Richmond slowed at first by heavy rains and then blocked by Confederate Major General John Magruder who commanded a significantly smaller force. Since his June 1861 victory at Big Bethel, Magruder had constructed three defensive lines across the Peninsula.

The most formidable of these lines was the second, a line that stretched from Yorktown, along the Warwick River, to the James River. As McClellan carefully surveyed the extensive Confederate fortifications, Magruder paraded his troops along the earthworks, and lined the trenches with “Quaker guns” duping the Union commander into believing he was outnumbered. Magruder, a student of drama and master of deception, completely fooled McClellan, who instead of defeating the numerically inferior Confederates immediately, spent a month in a siege of Yorktown. Magruder eventually abandoned Yorktown but the time gained had been invaluable.

Believing he was outnumbered became a common theme with George B. McClellan, partly because of the intelligence he received based on Allan Pinkerton’s “unique arithmetic”. This obsession with being outnumbered and with protecting his magnificent army from damage gave McClellan a case of “the slows”. This allowed the Confederates to solidify their defenses of Richmond as they retreated West. This combined with the wounding of Confederate General Joe Johnston—which caused the passing the torch to Robert E. Lee, would be the downfall of the Union effort during the Peninsula Campaign.

The Confederate Grand Strategy that led to Gettysburg

After the Confederate success at Chancellorsville, Jefferson Davis approached Robert E. Lee about the prospects of shifting some of the Army of Northern Virginia’s strength to the west. This, Davis explained, was needed to help rescue the better part of the western army and the stronghold of Vicksburg from sure doom. Lee disagreed. He was concerned about the wounded but still powerful Army of the Potomac. While the Army of the Potomac was on the ropes, Lee favored an alternative to draining his powerful force. Lee proposed an aggressive counteroffensive into northern territory. This, Lee felt would aid the grand strategy of the Confederacy by drawing Ulysses S. Grant and his formidable force away from the lower Mississippi Valley.

Taking some sort of action would soon gain a higher priority as Grant’s forces surrounded and laid siege to Vicksburg.  Now the task was to force Grant to lift the siege, and Jefferson Davis in contrast to Lee, again favored dispatching eastern Confederate troops to the west. The Confederate cabinet though, rallied in Lee’s favor, selling Davis, and the invasion of Pennsylvania became the decided strategy. The invasion they agreed would accomplish several things contributing to the Confederate strategy. Once in the north, they felt that the Federals would need to weaken the western armies to bolster the defending force—Davis’s primary concern, and that any victory achieved in enemy territory would have significant impact on the enemy’s morale and political situation. Coddington sums up the situation well through the quote of a member of Lee’s staff who wrote; “So, if General Lee remained inactive [as he most certainly would have to do if large numbers of his force were sent west], both Vicksburg and Richmond would be imperiled, whereas if he were successful north of the Potomac, both would be saved.” 

In addition a Confederate invasion would thwart the Union plans for continued campaigning in already ravished Virginia, because the Union Army would be forced to pursue the invaders. At the same time, the invading army could clear the Shenandoah Valley of the bothersome Federals who were threatening one of the key lifelines of the Confederate Army. Lee also hoped the taking the war to the north would give Virginia a chance to harvest crops, and strengthen its supply capability. At the same time, Lee knew that there were great-untapped resources available to the Confederacy in the enemy’s territory. Finally, if Lee were to win a major victory against the Army of the Potomac in enemy territory, this would strengthen the campaigning of the northern Peace Democrats and it might force Lincoln into negotiating a peace that would result in southern independence.

In preparation for the invasion, Lee made some significant changes to the structure of his army. The army consisted of two corps commanded by Jackson and Longstreet. Now, with Jackson gone—shot by his own men in a tragic accident at Chancellorsville, Lee decided to break his army into three corps. This would create three smaller corps that could be easier to control and to maneuver. The corps commanders were Longstreet, Ewell and A.P. Hill who commanded the new 3^rd Corps. This widening of command brought many new officers into the sphere of responsibility. These officers, although handpicked with the help of Jefferson Davis, would handle these new responsibilities with mixed results.

Lee also shook things up in his artillery. In the past, there was a policy of attaching artillery batteries to only certain brigades. This caused problems because most infantry commanders did not use the batteries effectively. Lee took the artillery from each corps and divided it into battalions of four batteries each.  He then assigned these new gun battalions to each division, under the orders of the division commander. This put the artillery into a larger strategic picture and allowed the division commanders to employ their firepower to the highest advantage. In addition, there would no longer be a large pool of guns under Lee’s own command. The key to the process now was the chief of artillery of each corps who acting under orders of the corps commander directed the efforts of the five gun battalions in the corps—along with the division commanders.

            The cavalry, under General J.E.B. Stuart would also undergo some changes to bolster its strength. This consisted of the addition of General W.E. Jones’s cavalry brigade that was campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley, and two regiments of cavalry that were campaigning in North Carolina. This all resulted in the addition of three brigades and some improvement in equipment. Stuart’s Cavalry was now at about double its former strength. 

            The Confederates that began the invasion were reorganized, strengthened and confident. They had been victorious in recent battles and considered themselves almost invincible under their beloved commander. All indications were that their beloved commander felt the same way about the invincibility of his army. This, feeling of invincibility bred overconfidence in the Army of Northern Virginia. This overconfidence would be severely tested as the forces converged with the formidable Union force at Gettysburg.

After General Hooker replaced Burnside after Fredericksburg, he immediately made changes to strengthen the Army of the Potomac. His ability to administrate changes to improve the army rivaled the popular McClellan—relieved for his reluctance to damage his well-oiled machine in a real fight. Among other things, Hooker improved the diet and the discipline of his force, making sure that the men where well cared for, and scared to death if they should straggle or desert.

Hooker also made changes in the structure of the army. He immediately did away with the “grand divisions” created by Burnside, and reformed his force into the standard corps structure with seven corps commanders reporting directly to Hooker. Hooker also reorganized the cavalry into one corps instead of several separate divisions. He also shuffled his leaders to place those he considered the most capable into the key positions. The Army of the Potomac, before Chancellorsville, was at its peak condition and strength thanks to Hooker’s abilities as an administrator.

Nevertheless, like McClellan before him, Hooker excelled in preparation, but lacked in implementation. Hooker was simply “out-generaled” at Chancellorsville, where Lee’s numerically inferior force beat Hooker’s superior force soundly. Hooker, according to Coddington simply lost his nerve when he met the stiff resistance of Robert E. Lee’s Confederates (Coddington p. 33). Hooker and his army retreated across the Rappahannock, considering their next move, as Lee met with Davis to do the same.

The loss at Chancellorsville severely damaged Hooker's credibility. Corps commanders and junior officers alike lobbied to remove Hooker from command. At the same time, Hooker’s army was shrinking as the enlistment terms of many of his regiments expired. The strength of the army dropped 20 % in the months after Chancellorsville. All this, and the loss of over 17,000 men at Chancellorsville added to the concerns of the North.

In the lull between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, there where many concerns in the Federal army—most centering on its commander. The force itself had shrunk, but the army was still capable and full of experienced veterans. Unsure of what to do, and what Lee would do, the Army of the Potomac considered the offense—while ultimately adopting the defense. In the end, the Union Army that moved towards Gettysburg was still numerically superior to the Confederate Army.

Clinging to command, one of the smart things that Hooker did during this time was to reorganize his artillery, and put it under the command of the capable General Hunt. The artillery batteries were assigned to the various corps, in their own brigades, under the direction of an artilleryman. These brigades were distributed to give each infantry corps one brigade, and the cavalry corps two brigades. There were also five brigades placed in the reserve. This process centralized the command of the artillery, making it comparable in command effectiveness to the reorganized Confederate artillery discussed earlier. This would be very important in the month ahead.

There was much movement of the armies during June. On June 9, the Union cavalry corps under General Pleasonton launched a surprise attack on J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry at Brandy Station Virginia. After an all-day fight in which fortunes changed repeatedly, the Federals retired. Brandy Station, the largest cavalry battle of the war and the opening engagement of the Gettysburg Campaign, was significant. Although Stuart claimed victory, the Union cavalry had surprised his force. This was a humbling blemish on Stuart’s reputation. A Union cavalry force that he should have beaten easily according to Stuart’s legend had fought him almost evenly. This engagement would bolster the confidence of Northern cavalry and was a surprise to people both north and south.

There were some smaller engagements fought as the armies drifted north. These were primarily a result of the Federal search for the Confederate force. These include actions at Winchester Virginia on June 13 and 14, and cavalry action at Aldie Virginia on 17 June.  These and other incidents of contact between the armies resembled a game of cat and mouse. The South in particular traveled blindly, since Lee’s main source of intelligence, Stuart’s Cavalry, was off gallivanting behind enemy lines. There is some discussion about whom to blame for this, since Lee’s orders to Stuart were somewhat vague and left open to interpretive initiative. Nevertheless, as Lee traveled north, he was generally unaware that the federal army was close behind.  

Although the Federals were tracking the Confederates north, there was still much concern about the Federal leader. Hooker was not the general to beat Lee. This point would become moot as Hooker rendered his resignation in symbolic opposition to some troop assignments dictated by his superiors as the Gettysburg campaign began. The relieved Lincoln accepted the resignation from the surprised Hooker, laying the groundwork for the assignment of General George Meade as the army’s new commander. Meade was not the best general in the army. Meade was not even the best general in the east. Nevertheless, Meade was the best general that was willing to take on the challenge, and he would prove to be capable of handling it. Meade took over the Army of the Potomac on 28 June, just three days before the confrontation.

Reports about enemy movements increased on both sides, with the north having a slight advantage due to Stuart’s continued absence. Meade ordered his army towards Gettysburg based on received intelligence. The armies regardless of the amount of intelligence they received seemed to be on a collision course, although no one knew definitively that Gettysburg would be the location for the great battle.  Though not planned, the ultimate meeting of two small forces early on the morning of July 1 would prove to be the spark that quickly grew into a great fire.

Book Review “Civil War Command and Strategy” Archer Jones

In “Civil War Command and Strategy” Archer Jones does an excellent job of painting the “big picture” of strategy in the Civil War. Jones examines the command systems and leadership of both armies and describes the various strategies that leaders used on both sides to attempt success.

There is much interesting discussion about concentration in space, and concentration in time. The author provides solid examples of how each side used these types of strategies while adjusting and evolving as the war progressed. The South for example leaned toward concentrations in space early in the war as Davis assembled large numbers in an attempt to secure his entire front. Lincoln, on the other hand seemed to lean towards concentrations in time attempting to coordinate much more difficult simultaneous advances of his inactive generals. While difficult to achieve, these concentrations in time eventually favored the larger army of the North. The Civil War was evolutionary in these concepts because of the modern technology that the commanders had available to execute these movements such as the steamboat, the telegraph, and especially the railroad.  Civil War commanders, in their use of these types of logistics, eventually revolutionized warfare, but they dragged traditional warfare into this evolutionary process. 

Traditional Napoleonic turning movements were at the heart of military doctrine during the Civil War. Jones provides excellent diagrams and examples that help one to easily visualize the intent and evolution of these movements. It is especially interesting to see his examples of the use of the movements through much of our history, even to the Gulf War, making the point that although warfare has certainly evolved considerably since the days of Napoleon, some good ideas are never out of date.

The use of raids, normally tied to Mosby and others from both sides, is an interesting and important portion of the author’s work. Defining key major actions of the war, such as Lee’s movement towards Antietam and Gettysburg as “raids”, really puts this key component of strategy in perspective. While on a grand scale--these were simply raids into enemy territory. The Confederacy was the first to use raids, but both sides perfected this strategy as Sherman’s march to the sea capped the war off.

During the Civil War, both sides eventually had effective command structures, although there was much growing pain such as the “kaleidoscopic” changes in command, never overcome in the Confederate Western Department, and eventually overcome in the Federal Eastern Department. Still, according to the author the ultimate overall field commanders, Lee and Grant “worked in great harmony” with their Presidents. Davis had the advantage here however because he found his General early on, while Lincoln’s quest took some time. In the end though, Lincoln’s General with his tenacity and ample resources would balance and ultimately outweigh the others on the playing field.

The American Civil War & Jefferson County, E. & W. Virginia Tales From a Debatable Land 1858-1866

The American Civil War & Jefferson County, E. & W. Virginia Tales From a Debatable Land 1858-1866

http://civilwarscholars.com/

From the Website:
A chronological re-telling through videos, podcasts, text and images of the incredible but true stories of one of the most war-torn, politically fought over places in the Civil War – Jefferson County, Virginia, (then “dragged-kicking” into – West Virginia) – where John Brown raids, is tried and hanged – the place of a hundred armed conflicts – starved-out farms – the escaping, fighting, spying and loyal enslaved – a freed, black man owns four farms in 1860 – countless home-hospitals for the wounded from the Battle of Antietam/Sharpsburg, (called “the bloodiest day in American history”) – Col. John Singleton Mosby’s Greenback Raid – where Gen. Phil Sheridan’s devastation of the Shenandoah Valley is launched; much of the Washington family living here.

This blog is sponsored by American Public University, a member of the regionally accredited American Public University Sytem. American Public University offers more than 80 online degree programs ranging from homeland security to management and liberal arts.

Jomini, Clauswitz and the Tactics of the Civil War

In discussing the development of an effective strategy for the prosecution of the war, the leadership from both sides drew from the same core philosophy—that of Jomini, and the teachings of the early nineteenth century.  As Archer Jones wrote in his article about Jomini and the Strategy of the Civil War, most Civil War commanders used Jomini’s strategies whether familiar with them or not.

On the Union side, this was especially prevalent with the early leaders of the war like McClellan, and others who attempted to fight this first modern war by the book.  The origins of strategic thinking began at the professional military institutions and evolved further in the war with Mexico where many of the Civil War leaders fought. This same type of strategy, although effective in Mexico, was no longer effective in the CW.  As Archer Jones explains, these Jominian tactics in fact led to the indecisiveness of CW commanders. John Shy gives several reasons why these Jominian tactics were no longer effective: First, all forces are not the same as Jomini espoused. Second, politics and war are not separate, although leaders like McClellan attempted to prosecute the war with as little Lincoln intervention as possible. Finally according to Shy, the experience of each leader did not conform to the modern war that the CW was becoming, and Jominian tactics did not address these new elements of total war.

In Civil War Command and Strategy, Archer Jones describes the Union strategy as leaning towards concentrations in time. This favored the larger Northern army according to the author. The North would make simultaneous advances against many different parts of the Confederate cordon defense, Because of the smaller Confederate force, the Southerners would be weak at one point and this would be the planned point of Northern breakthrough. This strategy eventually worked for the North as Grant prosecuted the war to a successful close.

As T. Harry Williams explained in his article “The Return of Jomini…” Jomini, and Clauswitz were on different ends of the scale. Union fighters started the war purely Jominian, (while losing battles) but evolved more towards Clauswitz’s concepts of total war to prosecute the war to a successful end. As this shift was made on the Northern side Lincoln shifted towards those commanders that embraced these concepts of total war.

When considering the evolution of the Union command system, one must consider the teachings of T. Harry Williams in “Lincoln and his Generals. Lincoln, began the war trusting the abilities of his early military leaders but quickly shifted to a more hands on approach as he learned of their ineptitude. Lincoln, according to Williams was forced to take a more hands on approach. Lincoln learned early on that the focus of the Union effort had to be on the Confederate army, not cities—like Richmond. Lincoln also understood the importance of public opinion and morale and he worked hard to develop a positive big picture to keep the entire North motivated for the fight.  Lincoln was very hands on according to Williams, until he found his general—in Grant. This hands on process led towards a more modern command system with Lincoln as Commander in Chief, Grant as General in Chief, and Halleck as Chief of Staff.

On the Confederate side, Southern leaders may have been more closely tied to Jominian philosophy then Northern generals since it took them longer to make the shift mentioned by Williams in “The Return of Jomini…” When considering the origins of Confederate strategic thinking, it is important to realize that these roots were exactly the same as the North, since the leaders had been taught in the same schools and fought in the same Mexican War. Although as stated by Williams in his article from “Why the North Won…” there were differences at the top. Davis acted more as General in Chief then Commander in Chief while Lincoln, when he finally found his General, was better able to manage the big picture. As Williams describes in the same article, under Grant the shift was made from Jomini to Clauswitz enabling the North to emerge victorious. Where as with the South, the best overall General—Lee was never given overall command and Jefferson Davis, was unable to prosecute the war to a successful end for the South.

The South according to Archer Jones in “CW Command and Strategy” focused on concentrations in Space in an attempt to establish a cordon defense and best use their interior lines. Davis knew the importance of holding as much territory as possible because any loss of territory would result in a loss of potential soldiers. The turning movement was at the heart of CW doctrine according to Jones—lessons learned again in the Mexican War. The Confederates used these turning movements extremely well. The South also used raids very effectively early according to Jones, but the North implemented this raid strategy as they prosecuted the war to a successful close.

Overall, the North did a better job of adjusting to modern warfare and developing a modern command structure according to the teachings of this course. While both sides seemed to start the war fighting the way they knew based on the teachings and experiences they received, the North caught on early. Under the leadership of Lincoln the North made the transition from Jomini to Clauswitz in their successful attempt to reunite the nation. 

Maryland’s Largest Civil War Exhibit Opens April 16th

From the Maryland Historical Society.

Baltimore, Maryland  (March 8, 2011) -The Maryland Historical Society’s (MdHS) Museum will open Maryland ’s largest and most comprehensive Civil War exhibit on April 16. The impact of the war on the people of Maryland will be told in personal terms in “Divided Voices: Maryland in the Civil War.”  The largest Civil War exhibit in the museum’s 167-year history  will occupy over 5,000 square feet and tell the story of a tragedy in three acts: the romantic war, the real war and the long reunion.  For more information on this 150^thanniversary of the war exhibit go to www.mdhs.org or call 410-685-3750.

The exhibit will take visitors back in time.  A “Time Tunnel” with 3-D videos will lead visitors back to 1861. There will also be interactive exhibits designed for children and adults as well as storyteller guides in period costumes. On Saturdays and Sundays the Maryland Historical Society Players will perform short vignettes of major events that took place in Maryland . Admission - $6 adults, $5 seniors, 3-18 $4, under 3 free. Museum is free on first Thursday of each month.

The romantic war was the first year or so of the conflict, when both sides saw the war as an adventure and patriotic duty. The real war over the next three years of bloodshed left hundreds of thousands of young men dead. The long reunion focuses on the reuniting of the country, which some say is not complete to this day.

Maryland sent 60,000 men to serve in the Union Army. Over 20,000 more served in the Confederacy. The first bloodshed of the war took place in Baltimore .  The human stories of these men and women are told by bringing letters to life with today’s technology, as well as the display of hundreds of rare objects, many of which have not been shown publicly since the 19th century. Museum visitors will see Robert E. Lee’s camp chair, John Brown’s carbine, Abraham Lincoln memorabilia from the Civil War era as well as compelling and heartbreaking photographs of the period.

Visitors will learn of Maryland ’s major battles like Antietam and of lesser-known battles like the Battles of Monocacy and Silver Spring . They will come to understand how the soldiers suffered. More than 600,000 servicemen died in the Civil War, compared to 400,000 American deaths in World War II.  It was the deadliest war in American history.

Museum goers will discover why the first widely-used bullet made this one of history’s bloodiest wars and  how this spurred advances in medical care. Triage, the ambulance corps, field hospitals and many significant surgical advances all began during the Civil War.

The war’s impact on Maryland ’s citizens will be revealed. Baltimore , for example, was under martial law and occupied by Union troops for the entire war. Lincoln ’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus ( people can’t be jailed without trial or a hearing) was famously used against John Merryman of Cockeysville , Maryland .  Lincoln was willing to break the law to keep Maryland from joining the Confederacy and cutting the capital off from the North.  The State legislature moved from Annapolis to Frederick to keep Maryland from joining the Confederacy.

Visitors also will learn the important role that African Americans played in the war. Over 10,000 African Americans served in the Union Army.  Harriet Tubman served as a spy for the Union Army during the war. Black soldiers such as Christian Fleetwood of Baltimore led African American troops into battle and earned America ’s highest military honor.

Women’s growing role in society during those years will be revealed. They began serving as nurses for the first time.  Women on the home front mourned their dead, creating the “Empty Chair” tradition at dinner tables in Maryland and elsewhere. 

The Civil War exhibit will run for the next four years with annual updates. Visitors to the museum will also find major exhibits of famous Maryland paintings, silver, furniture, maritime history and children’s toys from the last 300 years.  

The Maryland Historical Society was founded in 1844 and is the world’s largest museum and library dedicated to the history of Maryland . Occupying an entire city block in the Mount Vernon district of Baltimore, the society’s mission is to “collect, preserve, and interpret the objects and materials that reflect Maryland ’s diverse cultural heritage.” The Society is home to the original manuscript of the Star Spangled Banner and publishes a quarterly titled “Maryland Historical Magazine.” More information about the Maryland Historical Society can be found online at http://www.mdhs.org/