McClellan's Peninsular Campaign was characterized by faulty
intelligence that fatally slowed down his advance from Ft. Monroe to
Richmond. Urged forward by Lincoln,
McClellan's plan was to land an army at Fort Monroe, and move up the Virginia
peninsula toward Richmond. Shortly after deploying at Fort Monroe, McClellan’s
force began their movement up the Peninsula, approaching Yorktown. The Army of
the Potomac found its path to Richmond slowed at first by heavy rains and then
blocked by Confederate Major General John Magruder who commanded a
significantly smaller force. Since his June 1861 victory at Big Bethel,
Magruder had constructed three defensive lines across the Peninsula.
The most formidable of these lines was the second, a line
that stretched from Yorktown, along the Warwick River, to the James River. As
McClellan carefully surveyed the extensive Confederate fortifications, Magruder
paraded his troops along the earthworks, and lined the trenches with “Quaker
guns” duping the Union commander into believing he was outnumbered. Magruder, a
student of drama and master of deception, completely fooled McClellan, who
instead of defeating the numerically inferior Confederates immediately, spent a
month in a siege of Yorktown. Magruder eventually abandoned Yorktown but the
time gained had been invaluable.
Believing he was outnumbered became a common theme with
George B. McClellan, partly because of the intelligence he received based on
Allan Pinkerton’s “unique arithmetic”. This obsession with being outnumbered
and with protecting his magnificent army from damage gave McClellan a case of
“the slows”. This allowed the Confederates to solidify their defenses of
Richmond as they retreated West. This combined with the wounding of Confederate
General Joe Johnston—which caused the passing the torch to Robert E. Lee, would
be the downfall of the Union effort during the Peninsula Campaign.
No comments:
Post a Comment